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Abstract 
Ghana’s Social Health Insurance scheme, introduced in 2003, aims to remove financial 
barriers to health care access and bridge the inequality gaps in health care.  The scheme has 
been praised for its coverage, associated legal reforms, clinical audit mechanisms and for 
serving as a hub for knowledge sharing and learning within the context of South-South 
Cooperation. However, gaps and challenges have emerged in the implementation process and 
issues of universality, inadequate medical facilities and health care professionals, cost 
escalation and reimbursement of providers threaten the sustainability of the scheme. 
The paper reports on a study of implementation in two local government areas in Southern 
and Northern Ghana. The research design has been informed by new institutional theory to 
help understand the roles played by the various actors in the formulation and implementation 
of the policy. The focus is on the institutional field, which has developed around the 
implementation of the programme. The paper will profile key actors, and draw on interview 
data with them in terms of their history, values and belief systems and examine whether these 
have been challenged by the insurance programme and analyse organizational processes in 
which actors engage.  
Introduction 
Ghana implemented a social health insurance programme in 2004 as part of reforms aimed at 
“putting in place a mechanism that will ensure equitable access to an acceptable package of 
essential health services, without out-of-pocket payment at the point of service use for all 
Ghanaians” (Parliament, 2003) by removing financial barriers to health care. Prior to 
independence from Britain in 1957, access to health care was by the payment of some token 
fees mainly in the form of out-of-pocket payments at the point of service use (Arhinful, 2003; 
Agyepong andAdjei, 2008). Public and civil servants and their families within the colonial 
service were covered by the colonial government (Arhinful, 2003).  At independence in 1957, 
the government of the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) of Dr Kwame Nkrumah abolished 
user charges in all government and public health institutions across the country. Healthcare 
was largely tax-funded and, therefore, people went to hospitals free of charge. Access to 
health services in the private sector, meanwhile, continued to be by out-of-pocket payment at 
the point of service use (Agyepong and Adjei, 2008). Following the overthrow of the CPP 
government in 1966 coupled with the growth in the population of the country and worsening 
economic conditions, much pressure was placed on the limited resources (Yevutsey & 
Aikins, 2010) as tax funding of health care was no longer sustainable. The government was 
forced to seek alternative and sustainable ways of financing health services.  
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As an alternative, user charges were introduced in public health facilities across the country 
through a cost-sharing mechanism in 1969 with the enactment of the Hospital Fee Decree, 
(Yevutsey & Aikins, 2010).  By the 1980s, however, shortage of essential supplies and 
equipments at the hospitals following the adoption of the IMF and World Bank structural 
adjustments programmes (SAP) by the Government in 1983 necessitated a review of the user 
charge policy. The SAP was adopted to cut down on government spending and ensure 
efficiency in public sector management. As part of the SAP, user fees at public health 
facilities were significantly increased (Osei-Akoto, 2004:13). The introduction of user fees 
was aimed at generating more revenue to finance the health sector and to discourage the 
frivolous use of health services.  The 1983 and 1985 reforms succeeded in achieving the 
financial objectives to some extent but still fell short of expected revenue. The policy was 
subsequently, restructured in 1992, under what has become known as the “cash and carry” 
system in health care financing. The policy change aimed at full cost recovery by creating a 
policy of direct charges for usage of public health services in the country.  At this stage, 
access to health care was based solely on ability to pay and, therefore, some people were 
being excluded from accessing health services. The drop in utilisation levels was sustained, 
particularly, in rural communities (Waddington and Enyimayew, 1989; 1990). There were 
reported cases of delays in seeking health care with often grave consequences (Shaw and 
Griffin, 1995; Oppong, 2001; Mensah et al. 2010) as the sick, unable to afford payment 
avoided attending hospitals, clinics and health centres. Sharing of prescription drugs became 
commonplace among households (Asenso-Okyere et al, 1997). The consequence of this was 
the emergence of new behavioural patterns, and health practices. These included delays in 
reporting sickness to health care providers, consultation at drug stores, partial purchase of 
prescription and sharing of prescription drugs with household members, self-medication by 
way of using other left over drugs (Asenso-Okyere et al, 1997:224).  Some people also 
resorted to alternative methods of treatment such as traditional medicine, healing and prayers.  
Though the cash and carry system did achieve its financial objective and improved services in 
hospitals, the achievements were accompanied by visible inequities in financial access to 
basic and essential clinical services (Waddington and Enyimayew, 1989, 1990;   Agyepong 
and  Adjei, 2008; Gilson, 1997). 
In the midst of the negative consequences of the cash and carry system, proposals for the 
establishment of a national health insurance emerged from national and international 
organizations and groups including: the World Health Organization (WHO); the European 
Union (EU); the International Labour Organization (ILO); the Ghana Medical Association 
(GMA) and Labour Unions such as the Trade Union Congress. On the basis of these 
proposals coupled with the success of existing community based mutual health organizations 
in the country, the government through the Ministry of Health (MoH) in the mid 1990s,  
created a unit to establish national health insurance as an alternative to “cash and carry” 
(Agyepong and 2008; Yevutsey & Aikins, 2010). A number of  community based health 
insurance pilot projects were established as a precursor to the national health insurance 
scheme. Though the pilot projects were not particularly successful, the Social Security and 
National Health Insurance Trust (SSNIT) started planning for another centralized health 
insurance scheme to be run by a company called the Ghana Health Care Company 
(Agyepong and Adjei, 2008; Yevutsey & Aikins, 2010). This project failed to take off.   
It was against this backdrop of several unsuccessful attempts that the New Patriotic Party 
(NPP) government, which had campaigned on the issue of replacing the cash and carry 
system  won the general elections in 2000.  In August 2003, the Government passed a 
National Health Insurance Act (ACT 650) that aimed to improve access and quality of basic 
health care services in Ghana by removing financing barriers through the establishment of 
mandatory district level mutual health organizations (Yevutsey & Aikins, 2010). The NHIS is 
run nationally by the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA), an autonomous body set 
up to facilitate, coordinate and regulate the health insurance schemes  
Ghana has since made considerable progress with population coverage of 67.5% as of June 
2009 (WHO, 2010).  As of June 2010, total registered members consisted of 66.4%- an 
experience that is virtually unparalleled on the African continent. However, underlying these 
impressive gains in coverage are several challenges confronting the implementation of the 
NHIS. Indeed, even the coverage figures are disputed. An Oxfam report published in March 
2011 put it at not more than 18%. The dispute about coverage figures were raised by a 
number of those who participated in the fieldwork for this study and their comments support 
the suggestion that coverage figures are lower than reported. This issue will be returned to 
later in the paper.  
 
While policy makers, analysts and implementing officials and agencies point to a myriad of 
factors to explain the implementation challenges,  far less attention has been paid to the 
characteristics of key actors and how they relate to one another.  Yet, this is crucial to a 
nuanced understanding of the issues.  Institutional theorists have long argued that as a 
regulative entity, institutions both constrain and empower social behaviour by enabling social 
actors and action, conferring licenses, special powers, and benefits to some types of actors 
(Scott, 2008).  Thus, in the policy arena, powerful actors may sometimes impose their will on 
others through a number of mechanisms including use of threat of sanctions, and  
inducements to secure compliance.  The institutional approach may provide a useful means of 
differentiating between the impact that different actors have on implementation of the NHIS 
in Ghana.  
 Di Maggio and Powell view the institutional field as: “those organizations that, in the 
aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and 
product con-sumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar 
services or products” (1983:148).  Actions and behaviours of actors are viewed as being 
dictated by  norms and values. It is some of these values and norms that give rise to roles 
(conceptions of appropriate goals and activities for particular individuals or specified 
positions) within a particular institutional or policy setting (ibid.).  In this regard, it could be 
argued that the roles of the various stakeholders in the national health insurance programme 
implementation might be dictated by the values and norms of each stakeholder’s institutional 
field.  A  clear understanding of the institutional field of the different stakeholders in the 
NHIS policy environment will help provide an insight into the role each of them played in the 
formulation and implementation of the policy and the relationships between various 
stakeholders.   
Methodology 
The paper is based on a qualitative, comparative case study of the NHIS policy 
implementation process in two local government areas in Northern (Nanumba North Mutual 
Health Insurance Scheme) and Southern (Ashiedu Keteke and Osu Klottey Sub-Metro 
Mutual Health Insurance Schemes) Ghana respectively. The main aim of the study was to 
explore the role the different institutional actors played in the policy formulation and 
implementation process of the NHIS. Methodologically, two interlinked approaches have 
been employed in this paper: 
 There was an extensive literature review of scholarly papers on the NHIS in Ghana 
from various databases including some unpublished but relevant data; 
 
 The second methodological approach of the study involved in-depth interviews 
conducted with implementing Agencies and Institutions; Service Providers; 
Technocrats/Interest Groups; International Actors/NGOs; Politicians/Policy Elites; 
and Academics, Research Institutes/Think Tanks 
These groups were included in the study because of the roles they played in the policy 
formulation and implementation process. The NHIA, its regional offices and the District 
Mutual Health Insurance Schemes are the frontline agencies responsible for implementation. 
The NHIA regulates and operate the national health insurance programme. The DMHIS are 
the local level implementing bodies that register clients, contract service providers for the 
clients, vet claims of providers and serve as link between service providers, clients and the 
NHIA.  The service providers are the suppliers of health services to insured subscribers of the 
district schemes. Practical implementation is triangular with the DMHIS, the service 
providers and the subscribers. Their views are, therefore, indispensable to understanding the 
implementation process. The technocrats are the civil servants in the health ministry and the 
Ghana health service, who help in designing the policy and also assist in its implementation 
through training of DMHIS staff and advising the government on policy direction. They also 
conduct research on how to improve the programme. The International actors or development 
partners and NGOs were also included in the study because they provide technical and 
financial assistance to ensure efficient systems are put in place for the smooth operation and 
sustainability of the programme. NGOs, such as the Christian Health Association of Ghana 
also supply services through their health facilities. They also started the community based 
mutual health organizations upon which the current health insurance programme is based. 
The politicians or policy elites initiated the bill and continue to give direction to the national 
health insurance programme. Academics, research institutes and think tanks conduct 
evidence-based research into the national health insurance programme and propose policy 
recommendations.   
Thirty three in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted in the two local government 
areas between June 2011 to December 2011 and in February 2012.  Prior to the main 
interviews, negotiation for appointments was sought by going to the offices and work places 
of the actors personally, through letters, emails, and phone calls. This was to acquaint the 
subjects about the study and secure their willingness to participate in the research. The table 
below shows the numbers of interviews by sector. 
Table 1 
Sector Number of Interviewees 
Politicians/Policy Elites              3 
Implementing Officials/Sick 
Funds 
13 
Service Providers 5 
NGOs/International 
Actors/Development Partners 
5 
Bureaucrats/technocrats/Civil 
Servants 
3 
Interest Groups/Professional 
Associations 
2 
Academics, Research 
Institutes/Think tanks 
2 
 
Totals 33 
 
Context of Ghana’s Social Health Insurance Scheme  
Six main contexts define Ghana’s social health insurance programme implementation. These 
are: the cash and carry context; the political context; the socio-economic context, the context 
of non-consumption of health services; the context of existing community based mutual 
health organizations and the international context. 
The Cash and Carry system 
The major underlying context within which the national health insurance programme in 
Ghana finds meaning is the cash and carry system. The crises of cash and carry, which 
required upfront payment before treatment served as a barrier to health services. Sick people 
unable to pay were deterred from seeking medical care. The crises of user fees or full cost 
recovery had reached a point where politicians had to respond as utilisation levels dropped 
drastically in health facilities. Health insurance emerged as the best alternative and hence, the 
cost recovery policy played a part in the adoption of health insurance in Ghana. The argument 
that emerged, especially from the viewpoint of some stakeholders is that as a policy, the 
National Health Insurance Scheme is actually a natural development from the cost recovery 
policy with the scheme only replacing the payment at the point of service.   
The Political Context 
 The major driving force that gave impetus to the adoption and implementation of the 
national health insurance programme is the political factor. As indicated earlier, after 
independence from Britain in 1957, Ghana financed health services in public health facilities 
mainly through general taxation. As the population grew from about 4.5 to 5 million at 
independence, coupled with the stagnation of the economy due to series of coups and 
economic mismanagement, funding social services including health services became difficult. 
Successive governments, both military and civilian experimented with various forms of 
financing healthcare ranging between free medical services and token fees or user charges. 
When Ghana returned to constitutional democratic rule in 1992 after twelve years of military 
dictatorship, civil society groups and other interests began making demands for reforms in the 
health sector. The cash and carry system, which was then in operation became the major 
political focus of debate in the 1996 and 2000 general elections in Ghana. Three political 
parties; the Peoples National Convention (PNC), the National Democratic Congress (NDC), 
and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) all promised to abolish the cash and carry system if voted 
into power. In 2000, on winning the election the NPP set up a ministerial health financing 
task force to design a national health insurance scheme.  The political pressure to adopt a 
national health insurance programme was intense and accounts for the establishment of a 
health insurance scheme being one of the first priorities for the NPP government. Thus, the 
political window presented itself for politicians to gain political capital, and they latched on 
to it and propelled the adoption of the policy.  
The Socio-economic context 
Importance also has to be attached to the larger socio-economic context of pervasive poverty, 
especially in some regions and the rural parts of the country and widening health inequalities 
with regards to access and utilization of health services among the different socio-economic 
and demographic groups in the country.  Given that majority of Ghanaians could not settle 
their bills at hospitals, clinics and community-based health and planning services (CHPS), the 
NHIS was adopted as the government’s overall poverty reduction strategy so as to remove 
financial barriers to health care access. The national health insurance programme could be 
viewed as a poverty alleviating strategy given it aims to  assist the poor gain access to 
affordable health care.  
The context of non-consumption of health services (low utilization) 
Another context within which the NHIP germinated and blossomed was the non-consumption 
of health services due to the high rates of user charges and inability to afford out-of-pocket 
payments at the point of service use.  The decline in the consumption of health care in the 
health facilities when maternal, infant and general mortality were increasing led to questions 
about non-attendance.   The answer was simple - people could not pay. Access and utilization 
was, therefore restricted, not necessarily because of lack of essential drugs and other supplies 
at the facilities, but because of the financial barriers to health care.  With money being the 
problem, policy makers saw health insurance as the right mechanism to remove that barrier 
by spreading risks and pooling resources in a fund.   
Existing community initiatives (Activities of faith-based organizations) 
Prior to the adoption of the NHIS, communities themselves had taken up the challenge of 
access by establishing what is popularly called Community Based Health Insurance Schemes. 
They included sub-district schemes, work place schemes and faith based or religious groups’ 
schemes among others. In all about 58 of them existed at the time across the country and the 
experiences of their operations were positive. With the potentially politically charged field, 
coupled with the many problems of the cash and carry system, these provided an example to 
politicians of an alternative. The government felt that it could replicate the successful 
management and operation of these smaller schemes on a national scale.  
The International Context 
A year after Ghana implemented the NHIS, the World Health Organisation’s General 
Assembly Resolution (WHA58.33) called on countries to adopt innovative health financing 
mechanisms as a way of making health accessible and affordable to all its citizens.  The first 
two articles of the World Health Assembly urge member states: to ensure that health-
financing systems include a method for prepayment of financial contributions for health care 
with a view to sharing risk among the population and avoiding catastrophic health-care 
expenditure and impoverishment of individuals as a result of seeking care; and secondly, to 
ensure adequate and equitable distribution of good-quality health care infrastructures and 
human resources for health so that the insurees will receive equitable and good-quality health 
services according to the benefits package (WHO, 2005c). 
Prior to the WHA Resolution, in 2001, African heads of states met in Abuja and pledged to 
set a target of allocating at least 15% of their annual budget to improving the health sector. 
Adopting and implementing innovative health financing mechanisms such as social health 
insurance was key to meeting this target.  Thus, there was pressure at both global and African 
level to initiate more equitable and more effective health financing mechanisms. What was 
needed, therefore, was the political push, which was provided by the New Patriotic Party 
(NPP) government in 2003. 
Overall, Ghana’s health insurance has historical antecedents to its development and 
implementation but these are not the main focus of this paper. 
Overview of the Ghana Health Insurance Model 
The ACT (650) establishing Ghana’s model provided for three types of schemes: the District 
wide Mutual Health Insurance Scheme (DMHIS); the Private Mutual Health Insurance 
Scheme (PMHIS) and the Private Commercial Health Insurance Scheme (PCHIS). The 
DMHIS is a state-issued or sponsored health insurance programme and receives subsidies 
from the government for payment of claims and reinsurance in case of distress.  The major 
sources of funding include 2.5% VAT on goods and services or the health insurance levy; 
2.5% SSNIT contribution of formal sector workers; premium from informal sector workers, 
investments, donations, budgetary allocations, and other funding from donor partners. There 
are 145 DMHIS currently operating in Ghana as companies limited by guarantee. Initially 
they had their own boards but these have been converted to what is called caretaker 
committees in an attempt to impose greater centralisation.   
In terms of coverage, it is “mandatory2” for every Ghanaian resident to be enrolled onto one 
of the three schemes but in reality there is no enforcement. It has a  minimum benefits 
package of about 95% of all common diseases affecting Ghanaians and including general and 
specialist consultation review; general and specialist diagnostic; Antenatal care; deliveries 
(normal and assisted); caesarean session;  and emergencies. For a complete list of the benefits 
package and exclusion list, see the NHIS website
3
. Each scheme can increase the benefits 
package based on its financial ability. Also, although there is a fixed premium across the 
various socio-economic groups as determined by the NHIA, there are variations across the 
145 sick funds. The flexibility in premium and benefits package is to cater for local 
environmental conditions. While the north is Savannah grassland, the south is coastal tropical 
forest and the disease burden is not the same across the country.  
Policy Actors and Some Basic Attributes 
Table 2 below is an  institutional map of the social actors within the NHIP 
implementation policy environment. It can be seen that each institutional actor has its 
own functions and roles unique to its environment. The norms, values, ethics and biases 
differ from one institutional context to the other. However, based on Scott et al’s (2000) 
model, the institutional roles and functions of the various social actors that populate the 
national health insurance policy environment overlap. How do these roles and the 
relationships between the actors impact on  the policy formulation and implementation of 
the NHIS? 
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Policy Actors Institutional Attributes, Roles and 
Functions  
Functions in the 
NHIP 
Implementation 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Health 
(MoH)/Government 
(Political) 
-Norms: Sets Policy Agenda; introduce 
bills and change policies; design policies 
with the aid of bureaucrats in the 
ministry; engage development partners 
and other stakeholder in the health sector. 
-Economic Calculations:Seek to 
redistribute wealth between the have and 
have-nots; reduce government’s health 
expenditure by getting the public to 
contribute 
-Rules:Follows government laid down 
rules; sometimes,  logic of 
consequentiality rather than logic of 
appropriateness underlie official 
procedures 
-Hierarchy: Authority is in the hands of 
the minister who is a politician. The civil 
servants or the bureaucrats support the 
execution of the government policy. 
There is a wide power distance between 
the politicians and the bureaucrats with 
regards to authority. 
-History:  Implemented several healthcare 
financing mechanism since independence 
from free health care, partial cost 
recovery through to full cost recovery as 
part of government’s attempt to ensure 
sustainable funding of the health sector. 
 
 
 
Governance, 
oversight  
MoH/ Ghana 
Health Service 
(GHS) 
(Bureaucracy)  
-Norms: Implement health policies; 
Assist government in developing and 
shaping health policies in the country; 
Charge with the responsibility of 
providing quality health care services 
based on international standards. 
-Economic Calculations: Generate 
enough internal funds to supplement 
government subvention; Employees are 
motivated to save lives. Use their special 
status to secure better salaries and 
working conditions 
-Rules: Ministry of Health and Ghana 
health service and internationally 
acceptable standards. Follows logic of 
appropriateness. 
-Hierarchy: Ghana Health Service; 
Ghana medical Association and the 
Private Medical and Dental Practitioners 
Associations direct the affairs and 
activities of members. Members do not 
however, religiously follow directives of 
their leadership when it comes to welfare 
matters. 
-History: Since independence, the GHS 
has always implemented government 
healthcare policies together with other 
partners 
 
 
 
 
 
Governance, 
oversight and 
suppliers of 
services 
Service Providers Norms: Provide health care services, 
maintain standards and quality of 
healthcare, discipline, and values of 
members  
-Economic Calculations, Hierarchy, 
Rules and History are about the same as 
the Ghana Health Service and other 
service providers since they work under 
the various umbrella bodies 
 
 
Supplying 
Services 
Civil Servants -Norms: Execute government policies 
without question. Undertake research for 
effective formulation and implementation of 
government policies; and monitoring, 
coordinating, evaluating and reviewing 
government policies and plans.  
 
Advise 
government on 
policy direction 
of the national 
health insurance 
programme 
-Economic Calculations: Ensure 
government expenditure is manageable; 
resources are well distributed; plan and 
manage expenditure for the benefit of all 
-Rules: Non-partisan, secure tenure of 
office, continuity; neutrality; integrity and 
fairness 
-Hierarchy: Authority is bureaucratically 
through several channels from the top to 
the bottom 
-History: Carried out research on the 
health insurance programme since the mid 
90s through piloting of number of 
projects 
 
Political 
Parties/Interest 
Groups 
-Norms: Seek Political power and set 
policy agenda indirectly through their 
manifestoes and ideologies. Seek the 
interest of members and have the formal 
right to participate in policy formulation 
that is of interest to them. 
-Economic Calculation: Generate funds 
through various means including 
membership dues to promote their 
interest. Improve economic conditions of 
members 
-Rules: Constitution of Ghana and 
Electoral Commission Acceptable 
Standards. Code of conduct 
-Hierarchy: Democratic and consensus 
involving key leadership and members 
-History: Interest groups since the 1970s 
have often called for health insurance 
programme, while political parties made 
it an issue from the 1996 general elections 
in the country 
 
 
 
 
Oversight and 
purchasers of 
Services. 
Suppliers of 
services 
Implementing 
Officials and 
Managers of 
Insurance Funds 
(NHIA, Regional 
Offices of the 
NHIA and the 
-Norms:  Initiation of policy reforms in 
the area of the NHIP. Monitoring and 
Evaluation; Management of the insurance 
fund, claims payment. Registration of 
clients; issuing of ID cards 
-Economic Calculations: Generate 
Purchasers of 
services and 
pooling and 
bearing of 
financial risks 
DMHIS) enough funds to purchase services; ensure 
sustainability. 
-Rules: According to the principles of the 
NHI law 
-Hierarchy: Decisions are taking by the 
CEO and his or her management in 
consultation with the Health Insurance 
Council. District Scheme managers take 
decisions in consultation the Boards 
(Caretaker committee). Semi-autonomous 
in nature. Authority is a bit muddy in 
terms of governance 
-History: Set up from 2004 to assist the 
implementation of the health insurance 
programme 
NGOs & Int. 
Actors 
-Norms: Assist states and government in 
the formulation and execution of policies 
of interests to them through the provision 
of resources and technical expertise. 
Helping in capacity development and 
building. 
-Economic Calculations: promoting 
growth through Poverty Reduction; 
Encouraging citizens’ contribution to 
healthcare; Encouraging borrowing 
(World Bank) of member states. Seeking 
sustainability of the scheme. 
-Rules: According to their individual 
rules and regulations. Work according to 
their different cultural norms and values 
-Hierarchy: Country representatives in 
consultation with home governments or 
heads take decisions regarding their 
operations and activities. 
Supplying 
Services; 
Providing 
financial and 
technical support 
to the National 
Health Insurance 
Authority  
Academics, Think-
Tanks and Research 
Institutes 
Provide analytical and research reports in 
specific policy areas on a consultancy 
basis. 
Oversight 
Users Consumers of services. Consumers of 
services 
Mass Media and 
other Civil society 
Organisations 
Throws light on government policies and 
makes input to policies through various 
channels 
Oversight 
 While the government through the ministry of health sets the national health insurance policy 
agenda, it requires the parliamentary committee on health and the bureaucrats in the ministry 
of health, development partners and other stakeholders to shape and frame a policy 
acceptable to the population.  This requires consensus and effective control over the “street 
level bureaucrats” (district mutual health insurance schemes and health facilities and or 
service providers). Resources are also required from other sources such as development 
partners. However, the values of these different stakeholders are not always the same. There 
is also some blurring of responsibility and autonomy.  For example, under ACT 650 (2003) 
DMHIS are semi-autonomous and only responsible to their boards as body corporate. Thus, 
when it comes to controlling them, they can assert their authority by pointing to this 
autonomy but when issues of paying claims arise, they look to the centre for financial 
subsidies. There are also clear challenges in trying to exert regulatory control over health 
professionals. Evidence suggests this control is resisted with health professionals going on 
strike to lever salary increases and better conditions of service from the Ghana Health Service 
(GHS) or the Christian Health Association of Ghana (CHAG). Thus, the professional status 
of the health workers can be used to challenge the rules when it comes to implementation of 
the programme. At the time of writing (February 2012), some accredited private service 
providers under the scheme withdrew service provision in the Ashanti region of Ghana 
because of the piloting of capitation (rather than the current Ghana Diagnostic Related Group 
payment method) under the programme as a cost containment measure.  The impasse has, 
however, been resolved after several meetings with the service providers 
The National Health Insurance Authority is the regulatory body and operator of the National 
health insurance programme with the assistance of the regional offices. The regional offices 
main functions are to act as monitoring and evaluation agencies over the district mutual 
health insurance schemes and the service providers. The structure in terms of authority of the 
NHI programme, however, constrains and challenges the authority of the regional offices.   . 
One interviewee observed that: “they choose as and when it suits them to be autonomous”. At 
the national level, though the NHIA by law is an agency of the Ministry of Health and 
supposed to be answerable to the minister in its operations, it is noted that “the chief 
executive is supposed to report to the Minister of Health (MOH) but in practice what happens 
is that the CEO deals directly with the presidency. The MOH may just get a report but most 
of the day to day discussions are direct with the presidency”4. This situation tends to 
undermine the civil structures put in place for the implementation of the programme.  
The international actors or development partners (DANIDA, World Bank, WHO, Dutch 
Government support through the Dutch Embassy) and the NGOs see their  role as  ensuring 
that there is a sustainable means of financing for the health sector. The health insurance 
programme is, thus, a project in that direction and hence their support for the programme. In 
terms of norms and values, culture, economic calculations and other attributes, however, 
there are some differences, which challenge the process. The World Bank is a strong 
advocate of people contributing to healthcare financing. The Dutch government and 
DANIDA are greatly influenced by their egalitarian principles of equality and fairness in 
society, while the WHO seeks to ensure innovative and sustainable means of financing 
healthcare by providing technical assistance and advice to the government. The WHO leads 
the development partners in the health sector working group where inputs and advice are 
made towards ensuring the efficient running of the scheme. However, the basic challenge is 
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that sometimes the suggestions and advice of the group are ignored by the politician, who has 
different norms, values and orientation of doing things.  
Academics, think tanks and research institutes conduct evidence-based research and advice 
government on how to proceed with regards to the programme. One such organisation is the 
Centre for Health and Social Services (CHeSS), has recently carried out research on the 
health insurance programme.  
Challenges to Implementation 
This part of the paper seeks to present some of the impediments or challenges to the 
successful implementation of the NHIS and uses data from the interviewees with key 
stakeholders. Though generally regarded as a success in Africa, especially, in terms of 
coverage, and one of the best and widely accepted policies in Ghana since independence, 
stakeholders admit there are still serious challenges to the smooth implementation of the 
programme. Indeed, in the two local government areas, Nanumba North District Assembly 
and Accra Metropolitan Assembly, not all the same challenges pertained due to variations in 
local conditions; it is, however, the configuration of some of the factors presented below that 
militate against the effective implementation of the scheme. 
Capacity Development Weaknesses or Managerial Inability 
Since the inception of the programme, a major impediment to successful implementation has 
been the lack of capacity development or managerial ability. Empirical evidence from the two 
case studies in the study attests to the fact that the lack of capacity or managerial ability is not 
only peculiar to the sick funds or mutual schemes but also on the part of service providers to 
render quality service to the people. Though those employees who began the schemes way 
back in 2004 were giving some sort of training, the change in government in 2009 saw most 
of these management staff at the sick fund level either dismissed or transferred to the regional 
or national levels. Few of the management staff at the mutual scheme or sick funds level has 
any background in the operation of insurance or health economics. They have no basic 
medical background but regularly have to deal with health professionals  to purchase services 
for their clients. Likewise, claims managers do not have basic medical background it is often 
difficult for them to challenge the medical professionals about prescriptions and billing of the 
schemes.  There has also been a question about the relevance of the criteria (including lack of 
emphasis on insurance or finance) for recruitment of personnel into the district mutual health 
insurance schemes, the regional offices of the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) 
and the Authority itself. The Political nature of appointments was noted by an interviewee: 
“once you have politics; and you appointed people; and you set up so many mutual schemes 
with management, who have no idea, people who were given appointments for political 
reasons, you have these kinds of problems we are facing now”. 
As argued by a technocrat in the Ghana Health Service, service providers neglected 
fundamental issues regarding their own role in organising their facilities during the setting up 
of the schemes. Questions such as how many facilities would be required to cope with 
anticipated increased in numbers, what equipment and personnel would be needed in those 
facilities with the implementation of the NHIS were all relegated to the background. The 
outcome of this neglect is now glaringly obvious across the country and can be seen in the 
pressure on resources, the lack of health facilities and the lack of expansion.  Another 
challenging issue is the service providers’ lack of capacity and capability regarding claim 
management and the technological and specialist knowledge needed for this. Indeed, to most 
of the service providers, health insurance is a new area.  Training of personnel in all these 
areas is costly and sometimes because of the lack of the requisite personnel to vet and submit 
claims as early as possible, it takes time to get reimbursement. A service provider observed 
that: “we do not have enough trained personnel who are into claims. We are now taking 
people and training them and the prescribers, some are not filling the diagnoses and you 
have to go through every form”. Other service providers concurred that this is a big challenge 
to them.  
Spatial Distribution of Health Facilities and Personnel 
The challenges outlined are exacerbated by the spatial distribution of health facilities across 
the country. In the two local government areas in this study, the impact of the skewed 
distribution of facilities and health personnel is glaring. The Greater Accra Region alone as at 
2008 had 320 health facilities while the Northern Region had 237. During the same period, 
the Greater Accra region accounted for 4,599 hospital beds with 1,310 in the Northern region. 
There is less difference in the doctor to population ratio in the two areas. The population in 
Greater Accra is far bigger than in the North but the Northern Region is the biggest 
administrative region in the country and one of the poorest as well with communities sparsely 
located. In the Northern region certain areas or communities have no access  to even 
Community-based Health Planning Services (CHPS).  The Ghana Health Service law 
stipulates eight kilometres for access to health facilities, yet on the ground, some patients 
have to make over 24 kilometres before they can access health services. While in most parts 
of Europe or America travelling such a distance would take relatively little time, in Ghana, it 
might take about three hours.   Thus, the skewed and spatial distribution of health facilities 
and personnel is a serious hindrance to the implementation of the health insurance 
programme as subscribers can hold cards without being able to access health care because of 
the non-availability of facilities. Besides, the accreditation criteria by the NHIA require that 
every district hospital should have at least three doctors, ultra sound machines and many 
other types of equipment. On the ground, however, this is not the case as evidenced from one 
of the facilities in one of the two local government areas. The district hospital has only one 
non-resident doctor, who comes every Tuesday, and leaves on Friday morning or evening. 
Thus, patients do hold health insurance ID cards but no access to doctors. There is also 
evidence of two kids being admitted to the same bed presenting a very high possibility of 
cross-infection.   
Take- up of Membership Cards 
While there is some evidence of growth in registration in  the two case study areas,  the actual 
take  up of membership cards at the districts and sub-metropolitan offices is much less. One 
of the interviewees noted:  
“If you go to any of the schemes, ask you will see that they have a box of these cards 
sitting there and they are not able to send them back to their owners. What is happening 
there is that on the register, the membership is high but when it comes to card holding, 
there is that difference”. 
Some of the schemes explained the problems with the distribution of membership cards.  
During the registration process, registration points were created all over the districts or sub-
metros to enhance proximity and facilitate enrolment. Agents were also recruited on 
commission to go to the various communities in each district to register people. Other agents 
visited some communities on market days and registered subscribers. Now the cards are 
being kept at the district and sub-metro and municipal offices without any attempt to go and 
distribute them where they were registered. This problem is compounded by deficiencies in 
the address system in the country. There is also the argument that those in the hinterland 
areas see no point in collecting the cards if they cannot have readily available access to 
facilities. A myriad of factors, therefore, play into the inability to distribute the cards to their 
owners, which in turn questions the coverage levels as some cards are never picked up until 
they expire - even though they are still counted.  
Sustainability  
There is no doubt that Health Insurance has brought a lot of relief to families who could not 
afford to pay for their medical bills. Concerns have, however, been raised about the 
continuous operation and successful implementation of the programme in the long term. 
Clinical audits instituted in 2009 revealed massive fraud and corruption both on the part of 
the schemes and the service providers. Facilities got reimbursement for caesarean operations 
on men while scheme managers acquired so much wealth and property in no time.  Again, 
there were reported cases of rural community clinics with no caesarean surgeons and no 
capacity for caesarean delivery being reimbursed for such services. At other times, monies 
were found to have been paid to non-existing facilities. In addition, there is an abuse of the 
gatekeeper systems by the providers, which is putting further strain on the financial 
sustainability of the scheme.  
The following statements from an academic and a labour unionionist respectively point to the 
level of fraud and corruption that has engulfed and is threatening the financial sustainability 
of the scheme: 
 Many scheme managers have built houses, many health care providers have built 
houses, many pharmacists have built houses in no time because there are too many 
loopholes in the system that people can tap in. I can treat you for one disease and bill 
you for something else that I deem fit; there is no way you would know…If I am in the 
same house with you, you are sick, and you do not have a card, I would take your 
sickness … and go and describe it as much as possible, bring the medicine to you. If it is 
a child, the woman whose child is sick who is not insured would go with the woman who 
is insured whose child is not sick, then she would just swap the child.  
We are told, for instance, that the depth of the fraud was so much that some people with 
the cards even when they were not sick were going to collect medicines either for their 
relatives or for other sick people who are not registered. You find out that somebody will 
be coming almost every day complaining sickness just because somebody wants a 
particular medicine and he wants to help them out. 
Due to fraud and lack of risk management mechanisms, as well as the ambiguity of the 
Ghanaian health insurance model, the managers of the NHIS invest resources from the health 
insurance fund in areas that are not health related or purchasing of services. An actuarial 
study conducted estimated that if additional funding sources are not explored to support 
current funding, the scheme could collapse by 2014. The initial actuarial calculation showed 
that by the year 2014, if nothing was done to address the income source of the health 
insurance, it would run into a deficit
5
.  A contributing factor to the problem of sustainability 
is the low rate of premiums. They are not based on any actuarial calculations – and the 
benefit package is very broad. At the inception of the scheme, only about four million people 
were registered but now over sixteen million are registered and the premiums and health 
insurance levies are still the same. Delay in reimbursement of service providers could be 
                                                             
5  Interview with the Ghana Health service and a former minister of Health 
attributed to this lack of adequate funding. Though the World Bank has put in place $15 
million to assist the scheme, concerns have been raised about the way funds are utilized. 
Besides the financial sustainability, there are also concerns about political sustainability. 
Almost all interviewees agreed that no political party would attempt scrapping the health 
insurance programme. However, political interference in terms of appointment of the CEO, 
day-to-day management of the scheme, recruitment at scheme level as avenue for job for 
party members  all go a long way to affecting successful implementation.  
Client Shopping or Facility Shopping  
An interesting revelation that came up as one of the major impediments against the smooth 
operation of the national health insurance programme is what stakeholders described as client 
or facility shopping. This is a process where an insured patient moves from one health facility 
to the other with the same sickness within a short period of time with the aim of securing 
medicine which they then can sell. Even though mechanisms have been put in place to check 
for abuse, the fact that medical facilities are not networked makes it difficult for service 
providers to tell whether a patient has been to a particular facility earlier or the previous day 
and what medicines have been prescribed. One respondent laments thus: “there is a leakage 
in our system where a client can move from one provider to another within a day. He or she 
collects drugs here in SDA hospital, move to Central Hospital, collects drugs, go to Teaching 
Hospital collects drugs, put the drugs together and sell it to a quack doctor or a quack 
chemical store and make money.  That kind of thing, client shopping, they are shopping, 
using it to make money. That is our difficulty we are facing and is threatening the scheme”. 
The perception is that a majority of people see government facilities as a place where people 
make free money and this could account for this kind of behaviour.  
Anticipating Developments (one off payment) 
Membership enrolment has been praised but in fact membership renewals have been very 
poor and going down both in the urban and rural areas – including the two case study areas.  
Many subscribers want a one-time premium payment that would bring entitlement to health 
care access for life. Others fear that such a move could collapse the scheme and are thus 
reluctant to renew their memberships or even register at all. Change expectation is thus one 
major factor that has affected the operation of the scheme on the part of both the clients and 
even scheme staff. The operations of the scheme are constrained in a way because of the lack 
of direction to scheme staff. Schemes are semi-autonomous by ACT 650 but over the last few 
years, this autonomy is gradually being taking away. Recent developments demonstrate 
clearly that the NHIA is moving towards a central role. This in the view of the scheme staff 
ought to happen quickly to help alleviate the negative impact of uncertainty. This uncertainty 
is one thing that serves as a challenge and it affects almost everything.  One scheme staff  
asserts: “it affects the community, it affects the morale of the scheme members, it affects 
service delivery to clients. It affects the image of NHIS itself and if something is done quickly 
to get all of us to sing with one voice to be doing the same thing at the same time, I’m sure it 
will go a long way to help”. 
Reimbursement Blues 
Facilities pre-finance the treatment of health insurance card bearing members before 
submitting claims at the end of the month for reimbursement from the NHIA through the 
DMHIS. Indeed, health insurance has guaranteed funds and ensured that funds do not get lost 
through corruption and embezzlements as the money is paid directly into the accounts of the 
facilities. But the delay in reimbursement, of often three or four months has created difficulty.  
The mutual schemes maintain that part of the problem is due to late submission of claims by 
the facilities.  For their part, the facilities counter that according to the NHIS Law, invalid 
claims do not measure up to 10% of what is submitted for reimbursement.  The impact of the 
reimbursement delays as evidenced from the interviews as claimed by  some providers is that 
the long waiting period has forced them to  reserve about 40% of monthly treatment to cash 
paying patients so as not to go broke. Some also prefer cash paying patients where they can 
take their cash for supplies and equipments, which for some time now are no longer being 
provided by the Ministry of Health but from the internally generated funds. 
Discussions and Conclusions 
The implementation of the National Health Insurance Programme in Ghana has increased 
financial access and utilisation of health services to the majority of residents in the country. 
However, many challenges still abound as seen above. Besides the basic norms, values and 
core roles; hierarchy; economic calculations, rules and history, the implementation of the 
programme as a new policy has reconfigured roles, structures, and incentives, thus changing 
the array of costs and benefits to implementers, direct beneficiaries, and other stakeholders 
(Brinkerhoff, 1996). By helping to shed light on the nature and dynamics of the key 
stakeholders, knowledge of the institutional field could help an understanding of how to build 
consensus among the various actors and minimise challenges in the implementation process.  
A former manager of a district mutual scheme observed that: “from the Authority to the 
scheme level, we are not health professionals, we are just administrators and so the health 
professionals have an advantage, very huge advantage over health insurance staff…  You sit 
down before the doctor, he starts mentioning his medicines, he starts mentioning his scientific 
things, and he gets you confused.  You might attempt challenging but you will be defeated and 
so whatever they send to you to pay, certainly you have to pay … Even if you send it to Accra 
to the Head Office, you still have to pay the bills……. So you as a layman, you are a little bit 
handicapped to challenge him on his professionalism”. The special status, skill and 
knowledge of the health profession thus make this group of actors more prominent and 
influential over other actors. Buttressing the need for understanding the institutional field of 
the various actors, another scheme staff notes that: “the Authority still needs to do some 
training for the staff at the scheme level because most of the time what happens is that we are 
dealing with finance; and we are dealing with medical people”. The special training 
especially, of the medical personnel tends to empower them over the mutual schemes in the 
implementation process. However, the claims’ vetting and clinical audit process by the 
mutual schemes strengthen their hand in dealing with the providers. This sometimes results in 
conflict and tension between the providers and the schemes.  
In similar manner, while the government seeks to redistribute wealth and share risks through 
the National health insurance programme, donor partners, especially the World Bank  aim at 
ensuring sustainability of healthcare financing in the country through citizen’s participation. 
According to a bureaucrat, the Oxfam Report, which puts the coverage figures at not more 
than 18%, is indicative of a conflict between UK ideas (the promotion of free health care) and 
World Bank ideas - which favour US thinking. The World Bank wants countries to take a 
more business approach with loans so they are in business. These examples demonstrate the 
need for a nuanced understanding of the institutional field of the stakeholders if effective 
implementation of the programme is to be achieved.   
Thus, as institutionalists argue, to the extent that each of the actors has their interests and 
preferences to protect in the health insurance programme, there are bound to be challenges as 
the more powerful ones seek to impose their will and desires on the less powerful ones. What 
is important is that the stakeholders within the programme environment will have to 
compromise their institutional positions somehow and adjust to their new roles imposed on 
them because there is a relationship between successful implementation and the existence of 
dense networks of local organizations that enables communication flows among parties with 
different interests at the various level of the implementation chain.  
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